What will happen if IV is an n-bit random value? Then, the security degrades to as IVs may collide, which leaks the sum of hash values (total break in general) That is, we have a birthday attack w/ q = 2 n/2
Our goal Improve O(q 2 /2 n ) term in the FP bound of n-bit-IV randomized HtM so-called "beyond-birthday-bound-security"
...without expanding randomness! (longer IV is practically undesirable; comm. overhead, more random source, etc. )
Our contributions
Two simple proposals RWMAC Use n-bit randomness and 2n-bit-input PRF Enhanced Hash-then-Mask (Main contribution)
Use n-bit randomness and n-bit-input PRF Very efficient : one additional PRF call to n-bit rand. HtM
Blockcipher modes based on EHtM Hence we obtain the security bound:
(w/ final tag truncation to π bits) (similar observation given by WMAC paper)
If π = n and ε 2 -n , it is about q 2 /2 2n + q v /2 n 12 
We insert one additional (independently-keyed) n-bit PRF before masking w/ a simple preproc. (x,y)->(x,x+y) H is unchanged (ε-AXU) If π = n and ε 2 -n , the bound is about q 3 /2 2n + q v /2 n not as good as RWMAC bound, but still an improvement over HtM's bound q 2 /2 n + q v /2 n (w/ final tag truncation to π bits) Proof idea (contd.)
Add ε-AXU hash function to both cases
Now BAD occurs at most prob. ε /2 n for any (i,j,k), (both under EHtM and RWMAC) thus the difference is detectable w/ probability O(q 3 ε/ 2 n ) If BAD does not occur FP of EHtM is the same as that of mod. RWMAC, which is easy to derive (the same as RWMAC)
Details are more complicated ... Blockcipher modes Next, we try to instantiate EHtM w/ a blockcipher (which is assumed to be a PRP) PRP-based finalizations needed Main obstacle: PRP-PRF switching lemma will bring O(q 2 /2 n )-security degradation
An Alternative Mode: MAC-R2
Proofs of MAC-R1 and R2 
Conclusion
Two randomized MAC schemes w/ beyond-birthday-bound-security wrt IV length RWMAC : n-bit randomness, 2n-bit-input PRF EHtM : n-bit randomness, n-bit-input PRF, very efficient (only one add. PRF call from HtM)
Blockcipher modes based on EHtM Secure, efficient MACs using 64-bit blockciphers
